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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

:

v.

:

RICKY PALMER,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

Case No. 890583-CA
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petition for Rehearing of an appeal from judgment and
conviction for Retail Theft, a third degree felony.

The trial court

denied Petitioner's Motion to Suppress after an evidentiary hearing
held on August 23, 1989. R. 27; T. 81.

Immediately thereafter,

Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988), explicitly preserving his
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
R. 37; T. 81-2.
On November 14, 1990, this Court issued its opinion in
State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990).
copy of this Court's opinion.

See Addendum A for a

In its decision, this Court held that

the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the x-ray,
but remanded the case to the trial court for a "factual
determination of whether the ring would have been inevitably
discovered and for such other proceedings as may be appropriate".
Palmer 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44. This Petition for Rehearing
addresses the second aspect of this Court's holding.

INTRODUCTION
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In Brown v. Pickard, denying

reh'Q. 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court failed
to consider some material point in the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions . . . .
11 P. at 512.

Later, in Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah

1913), the Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in
proper cases. When this court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . . If there are
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
129 P. at 624. The argument section of this brief will establish
that, applying these standards, this Petition for Rehearing is
properly before the Court and should be granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the fact statement contained in the opinion, this
Court failed to mention any facts relevant to the State's argument
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that the ring would inevitably be discovered.

The facts relevant to

that argument are as follows:
In the trial court, the State focused on "exigent
circumstances" as "what the case hinges on."

T. 69. Without

developing any argument or citing any case law, the prosecutor
nominally alluded to the inevitable discovery doctrine, stating in
passing that "there is almost an inevitability of discovery". T. 71.
Sgt. Mayo, the officer in charge of the investigation and
the officer who made the decision that Mr. Palmer should be x-rayed
(T. 60), testified that after he went to Sears and assessed the
situation, he did the following:
I contacted the Salt Lake County Jail and advised
them we had a suspect that we believed had
swallowed the ring and if there were facilities
available to keep him under surveillance and if
the ring were passed, we could recover it. They
advised me it was not—they did not have the
capability.

Sgt. Mayo also testified as follows:
MR. BRADSHAW (Defense Counsel): You said the jail
indicated to you—Who did you speak to in the
jail, first of all, if you recall?
SGT. MAYO: I asked for a jail supervisor and the
gentleman came out and identified himself, but I
don't recall who it was.
Q: They told you they did not have a facility in
which Mr. Palmer could be kept?
A: No, what they advised me he didn't have the
capability to watch him until he passed the ring
and retained that and searched through it.
Q: So, in terms, did you ask if they had a room
which he would be kept in isolation?
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A: Yes. I explained the situation to him. We
had a subject who we believed had swallowed the
ring and did they have the capability of keeping
him under surveillance until he passed the ring,
and then recovering that so that we could go
through it and recover the ring.
Q: They indicated they didn't have someone who
could watch him?
A: They didn't say they didn't have the
capability.
Q: Ultimately, he was placed in isolation at the
Salt Lake County Jail?
A:

I don't know.

Q:

Do you know if the ring was recovered?

A: I don't.
Q: Did you ask them if they had a room in which
he could be kept absent someone to watch him 24
hours a day?
A: No, I didn't. I explained our problem and
asked them if they could help us. No. 1, I wanted
him kept under surveillance. And No. 2, he had
some sort of capability of recovering the feces so
that we could go through it. And they advised
they didn't have that capability.
Q: I guess, maybe we are not communicating, but
you wanted someone to watch him 24 hours a day.
What is the problem in your estimation with just
putting him in a room where he can't dispose of
the feces, where he is in complete lockdown in
isolation and keeping him there?
A:

Well-

Q:

Why doesn't that serve your purpose?

A:

Obviously, we have to have him pass the feces.

Q:

I understand that.

A: What we have is the capability of recovering
the feces so that it is not flushed away.
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Q: The feces can't go out of the room. Feces
can't go out of the room. He is kept in the
room. Why do you have to have someone watch him
24 hours a day?
A: Well., let's assume he just passed the feces
and he goes through it himself and he recovers the
ring, and then secretes it into his body again
somehow.
Q:

Okay, assume that.

A:

All right.

Q:

You have still got him in the room, right?

A: Yes.
Q:

The ring and Mr. Palmer are still in the room?

A: How long can we keep him in a situation as you
described, where you keep passing the ring and
recovering the ring and secreting it again, until
we reach a situation where we have, in fact,
violated some sort of rights by being able to
recover the ring ourselves.
Q:

Did you consider the option?

A: Basically, I presented the jail with my
problem and asked them if they could provide the
capability of recovering the ring for us, if it
was passed through his feces. They told me they
did do that.
Q: My question is, did you consider the option?
The one I purposed(sic) where he is kept in
isolation without someone watching him?
A:

Well, no. not specifically because—

Q:

Did vou purpose (sic) that option to the jail?

A: No. As I said. I advised them of our problem
and they best knowing their capabilities and so
forth, thev advised me that thev could not do that.
Q: Did you in the course of your investigation
and your decision as to how to proceed, seek and
find information in regards to how long the ring
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would be inside of an individual if they had, in
fact, swallowed it?
A:

No.
...

T. 32-35.

Following defense counsel's line of questioning, the

State did not ask any questions of Sgt. Mayo on redirect
examination.

The parties also presented a stipulation that after

the x-ray located the ring inside Mr. Palmer, officers placed him in
isolation, but not under observation.

T. 62.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence in the present case is susceptible to a
single factual determination.

First, the evidence unequivocally

demonstrates that an independent investigation was not in place when
the unconstitutional x-ray was taken.

Second, even if the "routine

booking procedure" alternative is applicable in the instant case,
the State presented no evidence regarding routine booking procedures
at the Salt Lake County Jail.

The evidence which was presented is

susceptible only to a finding that isolating and keeping a defendant
in constant surveillance is not part of the routine booking
procedure.
Because a finding either that an independent
investigation was in place or that routine booking procedures would
have led to the discovery of the ring would be clearly erroneous
given the evidence introduced at the hearing and the State's failure
to sustain its burden, remand is an unnecessary and time-consuming
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procedure.

This Court should make the only possible factual finding

and legal conclusion without remanding the case.
Alternatively, if this Court does remand the case to the
trial court, it should clarify that the remand is for factual
findings only, and not for a new evidentiary hearing.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE RECORD REGARDING THE INEVITABILITY
OF DISCOVERY IS CAPABLE OF ONLY ONE FACTUAL
FINDING.
In discussing the inevitable discovery doctrine as it
applies to the instant case, this Court stated:
This court cannot properly determine the outcome
of a fact sensitive issue where the record below
is not clear or uncontroverted, or capable of only
one finding. (citation omitted).
Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45.
Contrary to the implication of this statement, the record
in the present case is capable of only one factual finding and legal
conclusion—that the State failed to establish that the ring would
inevitably have been discovered.
In his reply brief, Mr. Palmer discussed the inevitable
discovery doctrine at length.

He pointed out that Nix v. Williams,

467 U.S. 431, 459, 456-7 (1984), the lead case in the area, requires
that an independent line of investigation be in place at the time
the constitutional violation occurred for the doctrine to apply.
See Appellants Reply Brief at 10-11, 14-15.

See also United

States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir 1984) ("if
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evidence is obtained by illegal conduct, the illegality can be cured
only if the police possessed and were pursuing lawful means of
discovery at the time the illegality occurred".

(emphasis added).)*

A few courts have extended the inevitable discovery
doctrine to include situations where routine booking procedures
would have led to the discovery of the evidence.

See United

States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1988)(discovery not
inevitable since "the record reveals no evidence that [inventory]
searches were an invariable, routine procedure in the booking and
detention of a suspect . . . " ) ; United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d
1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986)("routine booking procedure and inventory
would inevitably have resulted in discovery of cocaine"); United
States v. Ramirez-Sandoval. 872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)("The
government can meet its burden by establishing that, by following
routine procedures, the police would have inevitably uncovered
evidence.").
Courts have clarified that the fact that officers could
have pursued an independent investigation is not enough; the
government must establish that it would have done so.

See

Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1400; see also, 4 La Fave, Search and
Seizure. §11.4(a) at 384.
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in the
instant case is capable of only one factual finding regarding an
independent investigation.

Sgt. Mayo, the officer in charge,

clearly stated as set forth in the Statement of Facts in this brief,
that he chose to have Mr. Palmer x-rayed rather than pursue the
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independent approach of isolating him.

If the trial judge were to

find on remand that Sgt. Mayo was pursuing an independent
investigation at the time the illegal x-ray was taken, such a
finding would be clearly erroneous given the testimony set forth
above.
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has
addressed whether the "routine booking procedure" alternative is
applicable in this jurisdiction.

The applicability of such an

alternative is a legal question; if it is not applicable, the trial
court's factual finding as to whether routine booking procedures
would have unearthed the ring is irrelevant.
However, even if the "routine booking procedure"
alternative is applicable, the State failed to establish during the
evidentiary hearing that routine booking procedures would have
unearthed the ring.

The State presented absolutely no evidence as

to what comprises routine booking procedures in the Salt Lake County
Jail.

Although Sgt. Mayo testified regarding his attempts to

ascertain whether the jail had the capability to isolate and monitor
Mr. Palmer, his testimony did not relate to routine booking
procedures.

It related, instead, to a special request by an officer

overseeing an investigation.

This testimony, therefore, related to

the issue of whether an independent investigation was being pursued
at the time of the constitutional violation and not to whether
routine booking procedures would have led to the discovery of the
ring.
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In addition, the stipulation introduced by counsel did
not address routine booking procedures.

Instead, it covered the

actions taken at the jail after the ring was discovered pursuant to
the unlawful x-ray.

Where the subsequent recovery of the evidence

is triggered by or the fruit of the illegal search, the inevitable
discovery doctrine does not apply.

See People v. Knctpp, 422 N.E.2d

531, 536 (N.Y. App. 1981); see also Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at
1396, quoting United States v. Boatwright. 822 F.2d 862, 864-5 (9th
Cir. 1987)("This doctrine requires that 'the fact or likelihood that
makes the discovery inevitable arise from circumstances other than
those disclosed by the illegal search itself.'").
Furthermore, the evidence introduced during the
evidentiary hearing established that the jail did not have the
"capability" to isolate and monitor Mr. Palmer.

If the jail did not

have the capability to isolate and monitor a defendant when a
special request is made by an investigating officer, it certainly
does not isolate and monitor defendants as a routine part of the
booking procedure.
Given the fact that the State did not introduce any
evidence regarding routine booking procedures and the evidence is
uncontroverted that the jail did not have the capability to isolate
and monitor a defendant, there is simply no evidence in the record
which demonstrates that routine booking procedures would have led to
the discovery of the ring; the State, therefore, did not sustain its
burden of establishing that the ring would have been found as part
of routine booking procedures.
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If the trial court were to make a factual finding on
remand that the State sustained its burden of establishing that the
ring would have been located as part of routine booking procedures,
such a finding would be clearly erroneous.
Because the State failed to present any evidence during
the evidentiary hearing that an independent investigation was in
place or that routines booking procedures would have led to the
discovery of the ring, the inevitable discovery doctrine is not
applicable to this case.

Remanding this case for a factual

determination serves no purpose and delays the ultimate disposition
of this in custody defendant's case.
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests that this court
reconsider its decision to remand the instant case for a factual
determination as to whether the ring would have been inevitably
discovered and hold instead that the evidence is capable of a single
factual determination which leads to the legal conclusion that the
inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable to the instant case.

POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT THE
REMAND IS FOR FACTUAL FINDINGS ONLY AND THAT A NEW
EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NOT APPROPRIATE.
As this Court acknowledged in the opinion in this case,
the State has the burden to establish that the warrantless search in
this case was lawful.

State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv Rep at 43.

That burden applies to the inevitability of the discovery as well as
the existence of exigent circumstances.
Ramirez-Sandoval. 872 F.2d at 1399.
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See United States v.

Because the State has the burden and an evidentiary
hearing has already been held, this Court should, at the very least,
clarify in its opinion that the remand for ci "factual determination"
is solely an effort to obtain factual findings from the trial judge
and does not present an opportunity for the State to introduce
additional evidence as to whether the ring would have been
inevitably discovered.

If the State failed to sustain its burden

during the evidentiary hearing held on August 23, 1989, it should
not be given a second chance, along with the benefit of hindsight
and the appellate briefs filed in this case, to now supplement the
record with additional testimony,

Mr. Palmer respectfully requests

that this Court, at the very least, revise the opinion in this case
to clarify that the remand is for factual findings only,and not for
a new evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction without remanding the case for a factual
determination; alternatively, Mr. Palmer requests that this Court
clarify that the remand is for factual findings only and not for an
additional evidentiary hearing.
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inspect and value the property. Koplin testified
at trial that his appraisal of the property as
having a fair market value of $31,800 was as
of the date of the trustee's sale. His valuation
opinion was rejected by the trial court primarily because he admitted not knowing the
condition of the property at the time of the
sale and not entering the attic of the home,
where severe structural problems were evident.
Furthermore, Johnson could have attended the
trustee's sale and made a fixed-dollar bid to
protect his own interests, but he chose not to
because he believed that the fair market value
of the property was greater that his indebtedness. Because no other bidders attended the
sale, Thomas's bid did not scare off other
potential purchasers of the property to
Johnson's prejudice. Any injury to Johnson's
interests resulted from his own inaction and
imprudent judgment, not from any noncompliance with the statutes governing nonjudicial
foreclosure sales. We therefore conclude that
the trial court properly declined to set aside
the trustee's sale in this case.
In light of Johnson's failure to demonstrate
any clear error, see Utah R. Civ. P. 52, we
also reject Johnson's challenge to the trial
court's finding that the fair market value of
the property on the date of the trustee's sale
was $21,750. The other issues raised by
Johnson are completely meritless and we deem
it unnecessary to address them further. See State
v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah
1989).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed,
and the case is remanded for the trial court's
determination and award of reasonable attorney fees, authorized by section 57-1-32,
that appellees have incurred on appeal.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Johnson also argues briefly that the sale is invalid
because the trustee did not require the bid to be
"payable in lawful money of the United States at the
time of sale/ as allegedly instructed in the trust
deed. The trust deed, however, was not offered or
admitted into evidence at trial. In any event, we
believe that a credit bid by the beneficiary of a trust
deed is a bid "payable in lawful money of the
United States," even though the trustee does not go
through the meaningless motions of taking, with one
hand, actual money from a person as the highest
bidder at the trust sale and then returning the
money with the other hand to the same person as
the trust deed beneficiary.

Cite as
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L S
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ricky PALMER,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890583-CA
FILED: November 14, 1990
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Leonard H. Russon
ATTORNEYS:
James C. Bradshaw and Joan C. Watt, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, and
Judith Atherton, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant Ricky Palmer appeals from a
judgment and conviction for retail theft, a
third degree felony. Defendant filed a motion
to suppress certain evidence obtained from a
warrantless X-ray search of his body. After
the motion was denied, defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Stare v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Under Sery, defendant explicitly preserved his
right to appeal the denial of the motion to
suppress. On appeal, he argues that the warrantless X-ray search violated his rights
against unreasonable search and seizure. We
reverse and remand.
On May 3, 1989, at about 6:00 p.m., a
Sears security guard was called to the store's
diamond counter where a salesclerk informed
her that a customer had just taken a diamond
ring, leaving a paste ring in its place. When
the salesclerk called security, the customer had
left the diamond counter and was exiting the
store. The security guard examined the paste
ring and then proceeded after the customer,
defendant Ricky Palmer.
The security guard followed defendant out
to the store parking lot and waited until a
second security guard arrived. The security
guard then asked defendant to return to the
store with them. Inside the store, defendant
was informed that the security guards believed
he had switched a paste ring for a real
diamond ring belonging to Sears. Defendant
denied that he had possession of a ring. A patdown search was conducted with defendant's
consent, but the ring was not found. The Salt
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Lake City Police Department was called, and
Officer David Hendrix responded to the suspected shoplifting.
Officer Hendrix was joined at Sears by two
other police officers. Because they were unsure
how to proceed, Officer Hendrix called his
supervisor, Sergeant Foster Mayo. When
Sergeant Mayo arrived at Sears, a thorough
search was conducted of the store parking lot
where defendant had been first detained, and
the surrounding area. Defendant then submitted to a strip search but the ring was still not
located. At this point, the police suspected
that defendant had swallowed the ring. Sergeant Mayo telephoned the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office and the Salt Lake County
Jail for advice, and decided to proceed with
an X-ray search. If the X-ray showed defendant was not in possession of the ring,
Sergeant Mayo intended to send more officers
to conduct another search of the Sears parking
lot. Having already been placed under arrest,
defendant was transported in handcuffs to
Holy Cross Hospital at approximately 6:30
p.m.
After arriving at Holy Cross Hospital,' defendant objected to being subjected to an Xray search. Three police officers who had
accompanied defendant to the X-ray department told defendant that he did not have a
choice regarding the X-ray, at which point
defendant became combative. The police officers forcibly restrained defendant and the Xraywas taken. There was a shape resembling a
ring evident in the X-ray of defendant's
stomach. The police then took defendant to
the Salt Lake County Jail where arrangements
were made to place him in an isolation cell.
The ring eventually passed through his system
and was retrieved by jail personnel.
Defendant moved to suppress the X-ray
and all evidence obtained after the X-ray was
taken. Defendant argued that the warrantless
bodily intrusion violated his fourth amendment rights and that all evidence derived from
the search should be suppressed. The State
contended that the search was reasonable. The
trial court denied defendant's motion .to suppress, finding that the presence of exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless search
of defendant's body.
On appeal, defendant reiterates his claim
that the X-ray and all evidence thereafter
obtained should have been suppressed. Specifically, defendant argues that there were not
exigent circumstances present to dispense with
the warrant requirement; nothing clearly indicated that the ring would be found inside of
defendant; the X-ray was not a reasonable
method for locating the ring; and the X-ray
was not conducted in a reasonable manner.
The State argues that the X-ray search was
reasonable, but that even if the search violated
defendant's rights, the ring was still admissible under the "inevitable discovery" rule.
~

"

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a challenge to a
lower court's suppression ruling was stated by
this court in State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326
(Utah Ct. App. 1989): "In considering the trial
court's action in denying defendant's motion
to suppress, we will not disturb its factual
evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Id. at 327. See also State v. Marshall,
791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
"However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings, we
afford it no deference but apply a 'correction
of error standard'." Johnson, 111 P.2d at
327.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
"Warrantless searches and seizures are per
se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances
require that the search be performed before a
warrant can be obtained." State v. Christensen,
616 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Since the
police had no warrant to search defendant in
the present case, the State had the burden of
showing that the search was lawful. See State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990).
Both defendant and the State agree that in
order to determine if a bodily search violates
the fourth amendment, the applicable test is
that articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court set out
three requirements that must be met: (1) there
are exigent circumstances that justify the
warrantless bodily intrusion; (2) there is a
clear indication that such evidence will be
found; and (3) the method chosen is a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72. We address
only the first requirement in this case, because
we conclude that exigent circumstances were
not present.
In denying defendant's motion to suppress,
the court stated:
[T]he evidence shows that there was
such a high probability that
[Palmer] had swallowed the ring
because [the officers] had made a
thorough search of everywhere. No
avenues seemed left where it could
be. However, since that is a possibility that could exist, and because
it was such a public place and
because dark was approaching, that
the circumstances were of such a
nature as to require an immediate
final determination in this regard
and they were therefore justified in
making this determination and not
waiting for a search warrant.
The trial court explicitly relied on People v.
Williams, 157 111. App. 3d 996, 510 N.E.2d
445 (1987). On similar facts, the Illinois Court
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of Appeals held exigent circumstances were
present since "lT]he deputies needed to know
whether defendant had ingested the ring or
whether they needed to begin a detailed search
of every place defendant had been since his
arrest." Id. at 448. We decline to follow the
rationale of Williamst as it is contrary to established Utah law.
In Utah, in order to establish exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless
search the State must show either that the
procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety of the police officers or the
public, or that the evidence was likely to have
been lost or destroyed. Larocco, 794 P.2d at
470. "Once the threat that the suspect will
injure the officers or will destroy the evidence
is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the
officers cannot take the time to secure a
warrant." Id. See also Chimel v. California*
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (warrantless
searches only permitted to protect safety of
police or public or to prevent destruction of
evidence); State v. Ashey 745 P.2d 1255, 1259
(Utah 1987) (where there was an interested
party in the suspect's house who was aware
police were approaching, exigent circumstances
existed to allow warrantless entry of residence
to prevent possible destruction of contraband);
Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411 (for the warrantless search of automobiles exception to
apply, the police must have probable cause to
believe that the evidence will be lost if not
immediately seized).
In Larocco, the Utah Supreme Court simplified the search and seizure rules so that they
could "be more easily followed by the police
and the courts and, at the same time, provide
the public with consistent and predictable
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. The court
held:
This can be accomplished by eliminating some of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement
.... [Warrantless searches will be
permitted only where they satisfy
their traditional justification,
namely [1] to protect the safety of
police or the public or [2] to
prevent the destruction of evidence.
Id. at 469-470 (citations omitted).
Describing when the second exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement
applies, the Larocco court said, "the police
must have probable cause and believe that
either contraband or evidence of a crime ...
may be lost if not immediately seized." Id. at
470 (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d at
411). This definition of exigent circumstances
parallels that stated in United States Supreme
Court case law: that an arresting officer may
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person and in the area "within his
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immediate control," in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Chimel 395 U.S.
at 762-763. See also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
769 (a lawful arrest may provide the arresting
officer with the right to search for concealed
weapons or evidence under the direct control
of the accused).
The possibility that the ring may have been
discovered by some passerby or third person is
not an exigent circumstance. See Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 770 ("In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be
found, these fundamental human interests
require law officers to suffer the risk that such
evidence may disappear unless there is an
immediate search."); U.S. v. Corski, 852 F.2d
692, 695 (2nd Cir. 1988) (warrantless search
not justified by exigent circumstances where
the evidence was inaccessible to suspects and
there was no danger that it could be removed
before a warrant was obtained). In his treatise
on search and seizure, Professor LaFave cautioned against such a broad formulation of
exigent circumstances: "there is almost always
a partisan who might destroy or conceal evidence." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§6.5(b) at 656 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1990)
(quoting United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 978,
979 (5th Cir. 1970)).
There was also no justifiable reason to
believe the ring would be destroyed by defendant if he had swallowed it, as the State would
have us believe. People v. Bracamonte, 15
CalJrd 394, 540 P.2d 624, 631, 124 Cal. Rptr.
528 (1975) (defendant seen to have swallowed
two balloons which police suspected contained
heroin; no justifiable reason to conduct warrantless search since evidence could be retrieved through "the ordinary processes of
nature"). Compare Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
770-71 (it is impractical to obtain a search
warrant due to the rapid dissipation of alcohol
in defendant's bloodstream).
The State could have easily obtained a
warrant for this search. See United States v.
Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
Recognizing the delay that is often incurred in
procuring a warrant, Utah has allowed for
issuance of a search warrant based on a sworn
telephonic statement of the officer seeking the
warrant. Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2)
(1990). In light of the comparative ease with
which a warrant can be obtained under Utah's
telephonic warrant statute, little or no impediment is presented to police investigations.
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (quoting State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring)).
Applying the Larocco analysis of exigent
circumstances to the present case, we do not
believe the circumstances were such as would
justify a warrantless search.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

CODE • co

State v.

Provo, Utah

147 Utah /

INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
On appeal, the State argued that even if the
warrantless X-ray of defendant were determined by this court to be unlawful, the ring
which was subsequently seized by the police
after it passed through defendant's system,
was admissible under the "inevitable discovery" rule. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431 (1984). This court recognized inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary rule in State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d
1288, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The State raised the theory of inevitable
discovery below; however, since the trial court
found that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless X-ray of defendant, the trial
court did not have to decide the question of
whether or not the ring inevitably would have
been discovered. This court cannot properly
determine the outcome of a fact-sensitive
issue where the record below is not clear and
uncontroverted, or capable of only one
finding. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987). Issues that are presented in
search and seizure cases are highly fact sensitive. State v. Lovegren, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,
10(Ct.App. 1990).
Because we find that there were no exigent
circumstances, the motion to suppress the X-ray was erroneously denied. As to the ring, we
remand for the factual determination of
whether the ring would have been inevitably
discovered and for such other proceedings as
may be appropriate.
.Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
The State appeals from a November 1,
1989, order of "dismissal with prejudice"
entered at the close of appellee Todd
Willard's bench trial for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.
Because we conclude that the trial court's
action constituted an acquittal, which is not
appealable by the State, we dismiss the appeal.
Deputies from the Sevier County Sheriffs
Office set up a roadblock on March 10, 1988,
to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. They stopped Willard, who provided
them with a valid license and registration, and
they eventually searched his vehicle and discovered a controlled substance. Willard was
charged with two counts of violating Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989).
In accordance with Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2),
Willard filed a pretrial motion to suppress the
seized contraband, which was denied by the
trial court in January 1989. The case then
proceeded to a bench trial in May 1989.
After all the evidence was in and both sides
presented closing arguments, Willard renewed
his motion to suppress.1 The court granted the
motion, ruling that (1) the continued detention
of Willard, after the purpose for the roadblock had been accomplished, was unreasonable
and unconstitutional; and (2) Willard's
consent in fact to the search of the vehicle was
therefore irrelevant to the suppression issue.
Counsel for the State prepared an order granting the motion to suppress, which was
signed on September 19, 1989. Twenty-three
days later, the State filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the September order, ostensibly
to determine if the court had intended it as an
interlocutory order or as a "final order of
dismissal," which the prosecutor claimed
would be directly appealable under Utah R.
Crim. P. 26(3)(a) and Utah Code Ann. §7735-26(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) (repealed by Utah
Laws 1989, ch. 187, §15, effective July 1,
1990; now see Utah Code Ann. §77-18a1(2) (Supp. 1990)). In response to the clarification request, the court entered an order on
November 1, 1989, dismissing the case with
prejudice. The State then filed this direct
appeal.
In its appeal, the State does not claim error
in the dismissal itself. Instead, it seeks review
of the September 1989 suppression order,
asserting that the fourth amendment analysis
underlying the court's grant of the motion to
suppress at trial is erroneous. Relying on State
v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and Stare
v. Robinson,
797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct.
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